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The Exte:rJmality of Victim Care 
Alan J. Meeset 
In a world with no transaction costs, tort law would not be neces-
sary. Instead, injurers and victims would bargain among themselves to 
produce the mix of activities and care that would maximize their own 
and thus society's wealth.1 Of course, transaction costs do exist, and 
they are of sufficient magnitude to prevent bargaining between injurer 
and victim: for example, pedestrians cannot identify and write con-
tracts \vith each driver that might injure them.1 In this "real world," the 
economist's ideal regime of tort law would generate liability rules that 
induce injurer and victim alike to choose the activities and levels of 
care they would have chosen in a world without transaction costs.' 
For three decades, lawyers and economists II ave e,..-pended signifi-
cant effort evaluating the economic consequences of various common 
law liability rules. In so doing they liave sought to determine whicli li-
ability rule(s), if any, will maximize social wealth, that is, induce injur-
ers and victims to replicate the mix of care and activities for which 
they would have bargained in the absence of transaction costs. • This 
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I See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, anti liability Rules-A 
Comment,ll J L & Econ 67,67 {1968). 
2 See A. Mitchell Polinsl..'}',An Introduction to Law and Economics 39 (Little Brmm 2d ed 
1989}; Harold Demsetz, Wilen Does tlze Rule of Liability Matter?,l J Legal Stud 13,26-27 (1972). 
3 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Tile Economic Stntcture of Tort Law 31-
41,61-62 (Harvard 1987};Demsetz, 1 J Legal Stud at 26-27 (cited in note 2); Calabresi,ll J L& 
Econ at 69 (cited in note 1).As Professor Polinsl..J' has put it, emplo;,ing the example of automo-
bile-pedestrian accidents: 
[B]argaining obviously cannot lead to the efficient outcome because neither drivers nor pl!· 
destrians know in advance with whom to bargain. The Coase Theorem may bl! helpful 
nonetheless. Efficient legal rules for dealing with driver-pedestrian accidents still can bl! de-
rived by imagining what rules a driver and a pedestrian would have chosen if they could 
have costlessly gotten together before the accidenL 
Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 39 (cited in note 2). 
4 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 179-97 {Aspen 5th ed 
1998}; Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 5-46 (Han·ard 1987); Landes and 
Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 29-122 (cited in note 3);Stcven Shaveii,Stnct Uabil· 
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effort has yielded a consensus about the welfare consequences of par-
ticular liability rules under various conditions.5 For instance, scholars 
agree that, so long as reasonable care by injurer and victim will reduce 
the probability of accidents to zero, both negligence and strict liability 
with a defense of contributory negligence will induce the proper care 
and the proper activity by both victims and injuring parties.6 If, on the 
other hand, reasonable care will not reduce the probability of acci-
dents to zero, only a strict liability regime (with a defense of contribu-
tory negligence) will induce the injuring party to adopt the proper 
care and the proper type and level of activity and induce the victim to 
choose the appropriate care.7 At the same time, it is said, only a negli-
gence regime will lead the victim to adopt the proper care and activity 
and the injurer to adopt appropriate care.8 These conclusions apply to 
"alternate care" settings, that is, settings that call for care by only one 
party, as well as "joint care" settings, in which care by both parties is 
indicated. 
These findings have led to more general conclusions about the ef-
fect of negligence and strict liability on social welfare, as well as asser-
tions about the overall efficiency of tort law as a regulatory regime. In 
particular, scholars have argued that, by itself, a well-administered tort 
system can in many instances induce efficient combinations of care 
and activity, obviating the necessity of public law regulation.9 Indeed, 
some scholars have advanced a positive economic theory of tort law, 
ity Versus Negligence, 9 J Legal Stud 1, 1 (1980) (adopting as "welfare criterion ... the benefits 
derived by parties from engaging in activities less total accident losses less total accident preven-
tion costs"); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 323, 
323 (1973). 
5 See, for example, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 270-81 (Addi-
son-Wesley 2d ed 1997); Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 40-50 (cited in note 2); 
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 1-46 (cited in note 4); Landes and Posner, Eco· 
nomic Structure of Tort Law at 29-122 (cited in note 3). 
6 Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 40-46 (cited in note 2); Shavell, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Accident Law at 11-15,24-29 (cited in note 4); Landes and Posner, Economic 
Structure of Tort Law at 38-39, 6tHi8 (cited in note 3). See also notes 13-17 and accompanying 
text. 
7 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 274,280 (cited in note 5); Polinsky, Intro-
duction to Law and Economics at 49-50 (cited in note 2); Shave II, Economic Analysis of Accident 
Law at 27-28 (cited in note 4); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 6tHJ9 
(cited in note 3). 
s See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 69 (cited in note 3); Shavell, 
Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 28 (cited in note 4). 
9 See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 29-84 (cited in note 3) (con-
cluding that tort law can regulate accidents in a manner that generally maximizes social welfare); 
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 5-46 (cited in note 4) {discussing qualifications 
by these scholars regarding these general conclusions). See also J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be 
True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 Colum L Rev 1447, 1458-59 (1987) (arguing that 
positive economic theory of tort law reflects bias against public law regulation). 
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which holds that courts have, in fact, adopted those rules of tort law 
that tend to maximize social welfare.10 
This Article identifies an omission from the model scholars have 
employed to evaluate the welfare consequences of tort-based liability 
rules in a joint care setting. The consensus approach, it is shown, fails 
to consider the correlation between injurer activity, on the one hand, 
and victim care, on the other. More precisely, the conventional model 
fails to account for the externality of victim care induced by the com-
bination of injurer activity and certain liability rules. While injuring 
parties do, as the model assumes, internalize the costs of their own 
care in a strict liability or negligence regime, no liability rule induces 
injurers to internalize the cost of care taken by victims. The conven-
tional approach, then, does not recognize the (real) possibility that the 
joint costs of care induced by an activity might outweigh its benefits. 
Once allowance is made for this externality of victim care, the current 
scholarly consensus about the welfare consequences of negligence and 
strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence proves false. 
Indeed, identification of the externality of victim care suggests the ex-
istence of a second externality, namely, the ex1ernality of injurer care, 
which victims do not internalize when making activity choices. Absent 
a Pigouvian tax,~1 neither negligence nor strict liability \vith a defense 
of contributory negligence \vill reliably induce the appropriate type 
and level of injurer or victim activity, even in those cases where joint 
due care eliminates the risk of accidents. Thus, neither rule \vill relia-
bly maximize social wealth. 
Part I of this Article examines the conventional acc01mt of the ef-
fect of various liability rules on, among other things, injurers' activity 
choices. Part II offers a critique of the conventional account, demon-
strating that neither negligence nor strict liability \vith a defense of 
contributory negligence induces efficient activity choices by injurers in 
joint care situations given the externality of victim care. This Part also 
notes the existence of the externality of injurer care and suggests that, 
in light of this externality, neither regime can induce efficient activity 
choices by victims. Part ill examines the welfare consequences of al-
ternative liability regimes, including "pure" strict liability and "en-
hanced" negligence, in light of the insights offered in Part II. Part IV 
offers a partial explanation for the failure previously to identify the 
externality of victim care and examines some implications of this Arti-
cle's findings for the positive economic theory of tort law. 
10 See Landes and Posner, Economic Stmcture of Tort Law at 1-28 (cited in note 3) 
(sketching the argument that tort law reflects a dominant concern for efficiency). 
11 See Part ill.B. 
1204 The University of Chicago Law Review 
I. THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF NEGLIGENCE AND 
STRICT LIABILITY 
[68:1201 
As noted above, scholars have reached a consensus about the 
welfare effects of various liability rules, a consensus reflected in the 
leading works in the field. These works make use of a shared model to 
determine the economic consequences of negligence, strict liability, 
and other tort rules. Boiled down to its essentials, the account gener-
ated by the conventional model goes like this: Activities cause acci-
dents, and the social cost of these accidents is the sum of (1) the cost 
of care taken by vict:im and injurer when an activity takes place and 
(2) the damages suffered by victims of accidents that may occur de-
spite this care.12 Where care by the injurer alone will minimize the so-
cial cost of accidents, well-administered regimes of strict liability and 
negligence will each induce the same optimal amount of care by the 
injuring party, minimizing the social cost of accidents.IJ Most cases, 
however, involve a joint care situation in which care by both parties is 
necessary to minimize the social cost of accidents.•• In these cases, a 
well-defined negligence rule will lead both injurer and victim to take 
appropriate care!s Strict liability, on the other hand, will lead the injur-
12 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 271 (cited in note 5); Shavell, Economic Analy-
sis of Accident Law at 7 (cited in note 4); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 
59 (cited in note 3). Victims, of course, are those individuals who will suffer harm in the event an 
accident occurs. Injurers, it is assumed, will suffer no harm in the event of an accident. This 
Article will also assume that an individual is either an injurer or a victim and can never be both. 
See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 61 (cited in note 3) (adopting such an 
assumption); Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 5-6 (cited in note 4) (same). 
13 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 271-77 (cited in note 5); Polinsky, Introduction 
to Law and Economics at 40-42 (cited in note 2); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTorl 
Law at 63-65 (cited in note 3);Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 8 (cited in note 4). 
This Article will use "precaution" and "care" interchangeably. A strict liability regime is "well-
administered" if courts can calculate the damages resulting from accidents caused by the defen-
dants' conduct. A negligence regime is "well-administered" if, among other things, courts can ac-
curately determine each party's level of"due care" and whether the injurer actually satisfied that 
standard. As noted below, courts need not actually recognize a defense of contributory negli-
gence if they define the injurer's standard of care "as if' the victim is also taking due care. See 
Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 65 (cited in note 5). Unless otherwise in-
dicated, this Article will assume that courts make these and similar determinations costlessly. 
14 See Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 10-11 (cited in note 4) ("[I)n most 
real situations one supposes that it would be best for both injurers and victims to take a positive 
degree of care, however small."). 
15 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 276-77 (cited in note 5); Polinsky,/nlroduction 
to Law and Economics at 43 (cited in note 2); Landes and Posner, Economic Stmc/llre of Tori 
Law at 74-77 (cited in note 3) (giving examples to support this assumption); Shavell, Economic 
Analysis of Accident Law at 14 (cited in note 4); Brown, 2 J Legal Stud at 341-42 (cited in note 
4). This is so, it should be noted, even if the law does not recognize a defense of contributory neg-
ligence, so long as courts determine an injurer's level of due care "as if' the victim is also taking 
reasonable care. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186 (cited in note 4) (discussing "as if' 
approach to determining due care). If due care is defmed in this manner, injurers will take no 
more than the socially optimal level of care, knowing that, if an accident still occurs, they will not 
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ing party to take too much care, and the victim to take none at all.16 
This flaw can be cured, however, if courts temper a regime of strict li-
ability \vith a defense of contributory negligence!? 
If minimization of the social cost of accidents were the only goal 
of tort law, there would be little basis, aside from administrative con-
siderations, for choosing strict liability over negligence, or vice versa. 
Still, the mere fact that an activity is conducted in a way that mini-
mizes the social cost of accidents does not mean that injurer and vic-
tim would choose the activity in the absence of transaction costs. The 
costs of an activity might outweigh its benefits, even if those costs are 
minimized. This suggests an additional criterion for evaluating liability 
rules: do the rules induce parties to internalize the full social cost of 
accidents and thus to choose only those activities that are, on balance, 
cost-justified?18 More precisely, such internalization can cause parties 
to alter their activities in one of two ways. First, parties can substitute 
to a different type of activity. Second, they can engage in the same ac-
tivity less often. The owner of a pit bull can trade the animal in for a 
German shepherd; he can also keep the animal but take fewer walks.11 
Similarly, a common carrier can abandon trains in favor of barges or 
make fewer train runs.:a Fmally, a pedestrian who fears dog bites can 
substitute an exercise bicycle for walking; lie can also take fewer 
be liable. Knowing that the injurer will take sufficient care to avoid liability, the victim \\ill take 
reasonable precautions. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 277 (cited in note 5); Lnn· 
des and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 75-76 (cited in note 3). Sec also Douglas G. 
Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C Picker, Game Theory and dze Law 14-19 (Harvard 
1994) (applying the concept ofiterated dominance to derive parties' reactions to various liability 
rules). 
16 Because the victim will be compensated if an injury occurs. it has no reason to take any 
precautions. Knmving this, the injurer \vill take those precautions that minimize the social cost or 
accidents, given the rule. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 275 (cited in note 5); 
Baird, Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 14-16 (cited in note 15); Polinsh·y, In-
troduction to Law and Economics at 45 (cited in note 2); Landes and Posner, Economic StniCI!lre 
of Tort Law at 39 (cited in note 3); Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 11 (cited in 
note 4);Brown,2J Legal Stud at338 (cited in note 4).See also Demsetz, Wizen DoesTlte Rule of 
Liability Matter?, 1 J Legal Stud at 26-Z/ (cited in note 2) (victims \\ill take no precautions un-
der a rule of pure strict liability for injurers). 
17 Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 45 (cited in note 2); Landes and Posner, 
Economic Structure ofTort Law at 39,79-80 (cited in note 3); Shavell, Economic Analysis of Ac-
cident Law at 12-13 (cited innote4);Brown,2 J Legal Stud at 343 (cited in note 4). 
18 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 279-81 (cited in note 5); Polinsky, Introduction 
to Law and Economics at 46-47 (cited in note 2); Landes and Posner, Economic Stntclure ofTort 
Law at 39, 61, 66-fJ7 (cited in note 3); Sltavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 21-22 
(cited in note 4); ShaveU, 9 J Legal Stud at 7 (cited in note 4). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict 
Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 Am Econ Rev Papers and Pm:eedings 363,365-66 
(1980). 
19 See Landes and Posner, Economic Stmcture ofTort Law at 103-10 (cited in note 3) (us-
ing the example of a vicious dog to illustrate the distinction between care and acti\ity). 
20 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Lall' at 193 (cited in note 4) (using the example or 
railroad and farmer to illustrate the distinction between care and activity). 
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walks. A well-crafted liability rule will do more than ensure that an ac-
tivity (dog walking, transportation, or exercise) is carried out with due 
care; it will also alter the nature of the activity, the level at which it is 
conducted, or both.21 
A negligence rule is not "well-crafted" by this definition. Despite 
due care by both injurer and victim, some activities might still result in 
accidents. Under a negligence regime, an injurer that takes due care 
will not be liable even if its activity nevertheless produces significant 
harm.22 Thus, while injurers will internalize the costs of the care they 
must take to avoid liability, they will not internalize the damages 
caused by the accidents that may still occur. Instead, such damages 
will constitute an externality, that is, a cost borne by victims for which 
the injurer will not be liable.23 As a result, the conventional model pre-
dicts that injurers will engage in some activities that-while cost-
justified from a purely private perspective-will not be cost-justified 
from a social perspective.2• This shortcoming is not inherent in the 
concept of negligence. Theoretically, courts could consider the benefits 
of an activity as part of the negligence calculus, treating as "unreason-
able" any particular undertaking of activity that is not cost-beneficial 
from a social perspective.25 The costs of such an inquiry would be pro-
hibitive, however, and courts rarely conduct such an analysis in prac-
tice.26 
21 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 279-81 (cited in note 5); Landes and Pos-
ner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 108-10 (cited in note 3); Shaven, 9 J Legal Stud at 2-3 
(cited in note 4). 
22 Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 68 (cited in note 3); Shaven, 9 J 
Legal Stud at 2 (cited in note 4) ("By definition, under the negligence rule all that an injurer 
needs to do to avoid the possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due care if he engages 
in his activity."). 
23 Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 69 (cited in note 3) (concluding 
that under a negligence regime, the "injurer has no incentive to adjust his activity" because he 
knows that, as long as he takes due care, the victim will bear any accident costs). 
24 See Cooter and Ulen. Law and Economics at 274,279-81 (cited in note 5); Polinsky. In-
troduction to Law and Economics at 48-50 (cited in note 2); Landes and Posner, Economic Struc-
ture of Tort Law at 67-68 (cited in note 3); Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accidem Law at 23-25 
(cited in note 4); Shavell, 9 J Legal Stud at 2 (cited in note 4). See also Polinsky, 70 Am Econ Rev 
Papers and Proceedings at 365-66 (cited in note 18) (assuming that if injurer activity is held con-
stant, a negligence regime will lead too many injurers to enter the industry). 
25 See Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 25 (cited in note 4 ); Landes and Pos-
ner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 67-68 (cited in note 3).As Judge Posner has said: 
[Courts] do not ask, when a driver is in an accident, whether the benefit of a particular trip 
(maybe he was driving to the grocery store to get some gourmet food for his pet iguana) 
was equal to or greater than the costs, including expected accident costs, to other users or 
the road; or whether driving was really cheaper than walking or taking the train when all 
the social costs are reckoned in. Such a judgment is too difficult for a court to make in the 
ordinary tort case. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 192 (cited in note 4). 
26 See Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 25-26 (cited in note 4); Landes and 
2001] The Externality ofVictim Care 1207 
A rule of strict liability, by contrast, will purportedly induce the 
appropriate type and level of injurer activity. In a strict liability re-
gime, an injuring party will be liable for any harm that occurs even if it 
has taken reasonable precautions. Thus, an injuring party that engages 
in an activity will incur two distinct costs: the cost of care and the cost 
of any accident that occurs despite this care.:> As a result, it is said, an 
injuring party will internalize the social cost of accidents and compare 
these costs to the benefits of engaging in an activity.:' To be sure, pure 
strict liability will produce inefficient levels of care-too much by the 
injuring party and none by the victim.:' By adding a defense of con-
tributory negligence, however, the law can remedy this shortcoming."' 
According to the conventional model, then, strict liability \vith a de-
fense of contributory negligence will induce appropriate care by both 
parties, as well as the optimal type and level of activity by the injurer.'1 
Such a regime \vill not, it should be noted, induce proper activity 
choices by the victim, who can recover for any damages it suffers so 
long as it has taken due care.:-: Instead, only a negligence rule will 
cause a victim to alter its activity, as such a regime \vill ensure that the 
victim bears the cost of any accidents that occur despite due care." 
These considerations have led scholars to a more general conclu-
sion: so long as a change in victim activity is not a cost-effective 
method of reducing the number of accidents, strict liability \vith a de-
fense of contributory negligence \vill induce optimal care and activi-
Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 67 (cited in note 3). 
27 Polinsk")', Introduction to Law and Economics at 47-48 lcited in note 2); Shaven, Ect>-
nomic Analysis of Accident Law at 23, 28 (cited in note 4 ); Landes and Posner, Ewnumic Stnu:· 
ture ofTort Law at 66-68 (cited in note 3) lstating that under a strict liability regime, injurers \\ill 
reduce their level of activity and increase expenditures on care). 
:28 Pol.in'Sky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 47-49 (cited in note 2); Shavell, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Accidellt Law at 23,28 (cited in note 4): Landes and Posner, Economic Struc· 
ture ofTort Law at 67-fJ9 (cited in note 3); Richard A. Posner, Economic Ana(~·sis of Law 139-10 
(Little, Brown 2d ed 19n) (concluding that strict liability will cause railroads to internalize the 
cost of accidents that occur despite due care and thus \\ill"facilitate [ ] a shift to a better method 
of transportation"). 
29 See note 16. 
30 See Landes and Posner, Economic Stmctllre ofTort Law at 79-SI) (cited in note 3). 
31 Id at 39, 68-71,79-80 (cited in note 3): Shaven, Economic Ana(~·sis of Accitleut Lan• at 
27-28 (cited in note 4). 
32 See Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 49-50 lcitcd in note 2); Landes and 
Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 69-70 (cited in note 3); Shavcll, Eco11t:1111ic Analysis of 
Accident Law at 28 (cited in note 4); Shavell, 9 J Legal Stud at 7 lcited in note 4). Sec also 
Polinsky, 70 Am Econ Rev Papers and Proceedings at 367 (cited in note 18) tconcluding that, if 
activity of individual victims is fixed, a strict liability regime \\ill lead too many \ictims to engage 
in the activity). 
33 See Landes and Posner, Economic Stmaure of Tort Law at 69-70 (cited in note 3): 
Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accidelll Law at 28lcited in note 4); Sha\'ell, 9 J Legal Stud at 7 
(cited in note 4); Posner, Economic Ana(~·sis of Law at 140 (2d ed) (cited in note 28) (stating that 
only a negligence reginle \vill induce the victim to make efficient activity choices). 
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ties by both injurer and victim and thus maximize social welfare.14 If, 
on the other hand, circumstances are such that only the victim should 
alter its activity, a negligence regime will induce optimal care and ac-
tivity by both parties.35 Finally, in those instances where both parties 
should alter their activity, no regime of private tort law can produce 
the appropriate activity choices by both injurer and victim.:>6 In these 
cases, courts and policymakers must choose a "second best" liability 
rule. 
These conclusions about the relative merits of strict liability and 
negligence are subject to an important qualification, however. There 
are some activities that, when conducted with reasonable care, will 
create little or no risk of accident.37 The social cost of these activities is 
simply the cost of "due care," which, when taken, reduces the prob-
ability of an accident to zero. In these circumstances, it is said, there is 
no reason for either injurer or victim to alter its activity, since conduct-
ing the activity with due care will not result in any external harm."' 
Thus, the conventional model predicts that both regimes-negligence 
and strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence-will 
produce identical (optimal) levels of care and identical (optimal) 
types and levels of activity by both injurer and victim. As a result, 
when joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents, the conventional 
model concludes that both negligence and strict liability with a de-
fense of contributory negligence will maximize social welfare; that is, 
induce the parties to replicate the mix of care and activities they 
would have chosen in the absence of transaction costs. w 
According to the conventional approach, then, a well-
administered regime of private tort law will maximize social welfare 
whenever joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents, a condition 
that likely exists for many activities.40 Moreover, where joint due care 
34 See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 69-70 (cited in note 3); 
Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 29 (cited in note 4). 
35 Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 69-70 (cited in note 3); Shaven, 
Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 28-29 (cited in note 4). 
36 Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 29-30 (cited in note 4 ). 
37 See id at 24-25 (suggesting that many "everyday activities" involve only "a low risk of 
accidents when due care is taken"); Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 520 cmt h (1977) ("Most 
ordinary activities can be made entirely safe by the taking of all reasonable precautions."). 
38 Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 46 (cited in note 2) (noting that regula-
tion of activity level is only a concern when "expected accident losses depend not only on the 
care exercised by each party, but also on the extent to which each party participates in the activ-
ity that is the source of the dispute"); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 108 
(cited in note 3) (concluding that law imposes strict liability for keeping a vicious dog "(b )ecause 
care alone may not suffice to avoid an accident [with the result that) we want the owner of the 
animal to consider whether the dog is worth keeping"). 
39 See Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 24-25 (cited in note 4); Landes and 
Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 38-39,66-68 (cited in note 3). 
40 See notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
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does not eliminate the risk of accidents, private tort law can still in-
duce efficient care by both parties, as well as efficient activity choices 
by one of the parties. Thus, even where joint due care does not elimi-
nate the risk of accidents, private tort law can nevertheless maximize 
social welfare so long as circumstances are such that only one party 
should alter its activity. Private tort law will fall short only in those 
cases in which both: (1) joint due care does not eliminate the risk of 
accidents and (2) circumstances require both injurer and victim to al-
ter their activities. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL 
There is something missing from the conventional account of the 
economic consequences of negligence and strict liability with a de-
fense of contributory negligence. In particular, the model employed to 
generate this account does not recognize the externality of victim care 
induced by the combination of injurer activity and these two liability 
rules in a joint care setting. As shown below, the failure to recognize 
this externality generates incorrect conclusions. For instance, the con-
ventional model mistakenly concludes that negligence and strict liabil-
ity with a defense of contributory negligence will lead injurers and vic-
tims to choose the proper combination of care and activities and thus 
maximize social welfare whenever joint due care eliminates the risk of 
accidents. Moreover, when joint due care does not eliminate the risk 
of accidents, the conventional model erroneously predicts that strict 
liability with a defense of contributory negligence will produce opti-
mal injurer activity. Thus, the model errs in concluding that strict li-
ability \vith a defense of contributory negligence will maximize social 
welfare when changes in victim activity are not required. Further, the 
conventional model does not account for the e,._1ernality of injurer 
care and thus mistakenly concludes that a negligence regime will lead 
to optimal victim activities. As a result, the model erroneously con-
cludes that a negligence regime \vill maximize social welfare when 
changes in injurer activity are not called for. 
A. Victim Care as Externality 
A concrete example \vill facilitate analysis of the welfare conse-
quences of alternative liability rules. Assume that a railroad wisltes to 
run over an easement through a farmer's field:1 The train generates 
41 The following example, including the figures and table, is taken directly from Judge Pos-
ner's leading textbook. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186 (cited in note 4). It is as-
sumed here that farming is sufficiently profitable to justify locating tlle farm near the railroad. 
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sparks, sparks that will ignite the farmer's crops and cause $150 in 
damages. The railroad can suppress the sparks entirely, reducing the 
probability of an accident to zero, by renting a "super spark arrester" 
for $100 per run. Moreover, even if the railroad does not employ an 
arrester, the farmer can eliminate the possibility of an accident by 
spraying its crops with a potent fire-resistant chemical, at a cost of 
$110 each time the train runs:2 Finally, the parties can prevent any ac-
cident by acting jointly. For example, the railroad can rent a generic 
spark arrester for $50 per run, while the farmer employs a less effec-
tive chemical at a cost of $25. The following table will illustrate these 
various possible combinations of victim and injurer care as well as 
their social consequences. 
TABLEt 
Super Spark Generic Spark No Spark 
Arrester, No Arrester, Modest Arrester, Potent 
Chemical Chemical Chemical 
Railroad Care $100 $50 $0 
Farmer Care $0 $25 $110 
Cost of Joint $100 $75 $110 
Care 
Social Cost of $100 $75 $110 
Accidents 
As defined, this is a classic joint care situation-that is, for any 
given type and level of activity, the social cost of accidents will be 
minimized if both parties take some care. Further, because such care 
will reduce to zero the probability that the activity will produce any 
injury, it is said, the railroad can run its train-and the farmer can 
farm-without producing any harm:3 
Assume first that this set of circumstances is governed by a well-
administered negligence regime.... According to the conventional 
See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 33 (cited in note 3). Moreover, while 
Judge Posner assumes that victim care consists of leaving a firebreak, I have assumed that victim 
care involves the use of a fireproof chemical. The example is, of course, contrived for expositional 
purposes; farmers do not really employ fireproof chemicals. This slight departure from the sce-
nario posited by Judge Posner will illustrate the distinction, discussed below, between variable 
cost and fixed cost victim care. See notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
42 The chemical may, for instance, dissipate between runs of the train. 
43 See, for example, Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 24-25 (cited in note 4). 
44 A negligence regime is "well-administered" if, among other things, courts can accurately 
determine each party's level of "due care" and whether the injurer satisfied that standard. As 
noted above, courts need not actually recognize a defense of contributory negligence if they de· 
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model, such a regime will, under the conditions described, induce the 
proper care by both parties."-' Further, because such care will eliminate 
the risk of an accident, there is no reason for either party to adjust its 
activity, \vith the result that this regime will maximize social welfare. 
Moreover, unless tempered by a defense of contributory negligence, a 
strict liability regime \vill produce an inferior result: the farmer will 
take no care, while the railroad \vill rent the super spark arrester ... ~ 
This result-embraced by every major work in the field-is in-
correct. These works consistently assume, often quite explicitly, that an 
activity can produce only two social costs, even in a joint care situa-
tion: (1) the cost of care taken by tlie injurer and (2) the probability of 
an accident and the resulting damage to the victim." The model these 
works employ, however, does not account for a third type of social 
cost produced by an activity, and a third component of the social cost 
of accidents, namely, the cost of victim care, that is, care induced by a 
negligence regime in a joint care situation.~ Return to the example 
above. To be sure, a negligence regime \villlead the parties to reason-
able care, and thus reduce the probability of an accident to zero. 
Moreover, the regime \villlead the railroad to internalize its own cost 
of care, and the railroad \vill consider this cost when deciding wliether 
to engage in the activity. However, this regime \vill not induce the rail-
road to take account of the cost of care incurred by the victim if the 
railroad chooses to run. Thus, railroad activity will produce an exter-
fine the injurer's standard of care as if the victim is also taking due care. See Landes and Posner, 
Economic Structure ofTort Law at 65 (cited in note 3). 
45 See note 15 and accompanying text. 
46 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 274-75 (cited in note 5); Landes and Posner, 
Economic Structure ofTort Law at 39 (cited in note 3). 
47 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186-87,192-96 (cited in note 4); 
Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 279-81 (cited in note 5) (equating "harm" \\ith injury 
to victims and concluding that under a negligence regime, the "marginal risk of llann to others 
[from additional injurer activity] is externalized," while a strict liability regime induces the in-
jurer to "internalize[] the social costs of accidents from whatever source-whether from the ac-
tivity level or lack of precaution") (emphasis added); PolinsJ..:y,lmroclucJionto Law ami Econom-
ics at 47-49 (cited in note 2); Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accidelll Law at 23-24 (cited in note 
4) (arguing that a negligence regime may produce too much activity because injurers "\~ill not 
have a reason to consider the effect that engaging in their activities has on act:itlent losses") 
(emphasis added); id at 27-28 (stating that injurers will adopt optimal activity le,·el in joint care 
situation if forced to compensate victims for damages); id at 28 (stating that \ictims should en-
gage in activities whenever the marginal benefits of doing so are greater than the sum of the cost 
of victim care and the "e,.:pected losses that would result from [the victim] engaging in his activ-
ity"); id at 44 (mathematical appendix) (assuming that injurer acti\ity generates two costs in a 
joint care situation: accident losses and the cost or injurer care); Landes and Posner. Economic 
Structure of Tort Law at 39 (cited in note 3). 
48 See note 12 and accompanying text (noting that works employing the con,·entional ap-
proach include cost of victim care as a component or the social cost of accidents). 
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nality, with the result that the railroad may choose to run even if the 
benefits of doing so are less than the social costs of accidents, here the 
joint costs of care:9 If so, a negligence regime will not reliably maxi-
mize social welfare, even if joint due care will eliminate the risk of ac-
cidents. 
This intuition can be confirmed with the following slight exten-
sion of the farmer-railroad example employed thus far. Assume that-
costs of care to one side-the railroad will realize a $65 profit if it 
should run. In a world characterized by high transaction costs and 
governed by a negligence regime, the railroad will rent the ordinary 
spark arrester for $50, run, and realize a $15 profit. The farmer, in turn, 
will spend $25 on the fireproof chemical. Yet, if transaction costs were 
nonexistent the railroad would not run, that is, it would forgo the ac-
tivity. If the railroad possessed an unqualified right to enjoy its right of 
way, including a right to emit sparks that damaged the farmer's crops, 
the farmer could offer to pay the railroad $50 to cover the cost of a 
generic spark arrester, and also incur a $25 expense to purchase the 
fireproof chemical.50 An even better course for the farmer, however, 
would be to pay the railroad $70 not to run in the first place. The rail-
road, of course, would prefer such a payment to making a run, which 
would only produce a (private) profit of $65. Similarly, if the railroad 
owned the farm, it would refrain from running; if it did run, the enter-
prise as a whole, and thus society, would lose $10.5' Application of a 
negligence regime in these circumstances, then, would not satisfy the 
condition for ideal liability rules producing, as it would, a result differ-
ent from that for which the parties would have bargained in a world 
free of transaction costs. 52 
The same (suboptimal) result obtains, it should be noted, under a 
regime of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. 
Like negligence, such a regime will minimize the social cost of acci-
dents by inducing both the railroad and the farmer to take due care." 
Also like negligence, however, this regime will not cause the injuring 
party to internalize the cost of victim care induced by its activity and 
49 See text accompanying note 23 (defining externalities). 
50 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 6-7 (1960) (stating that a 
farmer will pay a rancher up to the cost of fencing cattle out to reduce size of its herd). 
5! See generally Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 32-33,35 (cited in 
note 3) (assuming that "single ownership solution" replicates efficient result); Dcmsetz,1 J Legal 
Stud at 19-20 (cited in note 2) (same). See also Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and 
the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase,36 J L & Econ 553,555-57 (1993) (same). 
52 See note 3 and accompanying text (describing this economic criterion for optimal tort 
rules). 
53 Sec notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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the liability rule governing it. Thus, the railroad's private cost of a run 
(its own cost of care) will be less than the social cost (its own cost of 
care plus the cost of care incurred by the fanner) with the result that 
the railroad may choose to run even if the social cost of accidents is 
greater than the benefits of the activity. 
Thus far we have assumed, for e>..-positional purposes, that joint 
due care will reduce the probability of an accident to zero. Still, the ex-
ternality of victim care identified here exists regardless whether this 
special condition obtains. Assume for a moment that, even if the 
farmer and the railroad take due care, there is still some positive 
chance of an accident. Under a negligence regime, the railroad will in-
ternalize neither the cost of such accidents nor the cost of victim care. 
Under a regime of strict liability with a defense of contributory negli-
gence, the railroad will internalize the costs of any accidents, and it 
will make its activity choice accordingly. \I Scholars employing the con-
ventional model have assumed that this type of adjustment will be suf-
ficient to ensure that any injurer activity that occurs is socially benefi-
cial.55 However, the railroad will not internalize the cost of victim care 
54 See id. 
55 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 274,280 (cited in note 5) (concluding that. 
under strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, "the residual bearer of harm in-
temalizcli the benefits of any of his or her actions that reduce the probability or severity of acci-
dents" and that "the residual bearer of harm has incentives for an efficient activity level"); 
Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 47-50 (cited in note 2) (same); Shaven. Eca. 
nomic Analysis of Accident Law at 27-28 (cited in note 4) (stating that, under a regime of strict 
liability with a defense of contributory negligence, "injurers \\ill pay for the accident losses they 
cause and thus ..• will choose the correct level of their activity given \ictims' beha\ior"); id at 28 
(stating that it "would be desirable [for the victim to) engage in his acti\'ity only when his utility 
would exceed the cost of taking care plus the ex"Pected accident losses that would result from his 
engaging in his activity"); id at 44 (mathematical appendix) (concluding that injurers \\ill choose 
the socially correct activity because they will compare the utility from that acti\ity to their O\\n 
cost of precautions and expected accident losses); Landes and Posner, Economic Stntcrure ofTort 
Law at 3S-39 (cited in note 3) ("When efficiency requires that both parties take measures [in-
cluding activity changes] to reduce damages, a rule of strict liability \\ith a defense based on the 
victim's failure to take cost-justified measures to reduce damages (contributory negligence) \\ill 
achieve the efficient solution."); id at 79-SO (concluding that strict liability \\ith defense of con-
tributory negligence will provide injurers \\ith proper incentive to alter their activities in a joint 
care setting); id at 118 (stating that "strict liability, to be an efficient rule of liability, requires-
unlike negligence liability-a defense of contributory negligence"). 
Although they assert that strict liability \\ith a defense of contributory negligence \\ill induce 
injurers to adopt the proper types and level of activity, Judge Posner and Professor Landes note 
that tort law does not, in fact, recognize such a defense. Sec id at llS-19. Attempting to explain 
the absence of such a defense, they suggest that the cost of victim precautic ns induced by a con-
tributory negligence defense may in many instances exceed the benefits of engaging in an ultra-
hazardous activity. See id at 119. See also notes 105-(19 and accompan)in!! text (offering more 
detailed exposition of similar \iew). They do not. however, discuss the relevance of this realiza-
tion to their previous conclusions that. for instance, a negligence regime \\ill induce appropriate 
activity choices where joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents. Instead. they ultimately 
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that will be induced by its decision to engage in the activity. Thus, 
while strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence will in-
duce different activity choices when compared to a negligence regime, 
activity will nevertheless depart from the social optimum, as activity 
decisions will not reflect the internalization of the full social costs of 
accidents, given the externality of victim care. 
The source of the flaw in the liability rules under consideration is 
easy to identify, particularly if one proceeds by analogy. As noted ear-
lier, a negligence standard does not inherently produce improper ac-
tivity choices by injurers; courts could, conceivably, define as "negli-
gent" an injurer's decision to engage in an activity that is not cost 
justified. 56 Similarly, courts could, conceivably, undertake such a calcu-
lation when determining whether a victim was contributorily negli-
gent. To be precise, courts could set the victim's level of care "as if' the 
injuring party were itself exercising due care, including in the calcula-
tion of injurer "due care" a consideration of the benefits of the activity 
in question.57 Potential victims, then, would only be required to take 
care in those instances in which it was reasonable to do so, that is, 
where the benefits of an activity were greater than the joint costs of 
conclude that courts should not allow a defense of contributory negligence to strict liability be-
cause doing so would effectively convert strict liability into a negligence regime. I.:.andes and 
Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 119 (cited in note 3). This shortcoming, they suggest, 
explains why courts do not generally recognize a defense of contributory negligence in the strict 
liability context. Id. As explained below, however, recognition of a defense of contributory negli-
gence will not, in fact, convert a strict liability regime into a regime of negligence. Sec note 57. 
56 See notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
57 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186-87 (cited in note 4) (discussing "as if' ap-
proach to determining standard of care in a negligence regime). Professor Landes and Judge 
Posner also recognize that courts could, theoretically, engage in such a calculation, but agree that 
such an approach would be impractical. See Landes and Posner, Economic Structllre of Tort Law 
at 119 (cited in note 3).As noted above, they do not recognize the implication of this shortcom-
ing for their assertion that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence will induce 
optimal levels of injurer activity. See note 55. Instead, they suggest that courts should refrain 
from recognizing a defense of contributory negligence in this context because consideration of 
such a defense would require courts to determine "whether the injurer was negligent to deter-
mine whether the victim was negligent," thus "convert[ing] strict liability into a regime of negli-
gence." See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 119 (cited in note 3). 
The assertion that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence will operate as the 
equivalent of a negligence regime does not appear to be correct. To be sure, in a joint care situa-
tion, courts must determine the injurer's optimal level of care in order to determine the optimal 
level of victim care. Courts need not, however, determine what precautions the injurer actually 
took to administer a regime of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. Sec 
Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 17 (cited in note 4). Under such a regime, injurers 
will remain liable regardless of whether they took reasonable precautions, so long as the victim 
took appropriate precautions. Contrary to the result produced by a negligence regime, then, in-
jurers will internalizf- the cost of accidents that still result from their activity, even when con-
ducted with due Goint) care. 
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care. If, on the other hand, victim care was not a reasonable method of 
avoiding the accident in question, no defense of contributory negli-
gence would be available, and the defendant would pay the cost of any 
resulting accident. Such a regime would induce victim care only when 
the benefits of an activity outweighed its social costs-the joint costs 
of care and any resulting damage. Of course, such a regime is more 
hypothetical than real, suggesting that, as implemented in the real 
world, regimes that induce victim care \viii lead injurers to make im-
proper activity choices. 
B. The Victim Care Externality and Injurer Activities 
To this point, the analysis offered here has focused on the effect 
of various liability rules on the decision whether to engage in an activ-
ity, for example, whether a common carrier should transport its cargo 
by rail or, instead, by barge. Both negligence and strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence, it has been shown, \viii induce in-
jurers to choose types of activities that are not socially optimal. Still, 
as noted earlier, injurers can reduce the probability of accidents not 
only by abandoning an activity and choosing a different one, but also 
by taking the less drastic step of continuing to engage in the activity 
but at a reduced level.53 And, one suspects that the socially efficient re-
sult \viii sometimes involve such a moderate course. Even one walk of 
the pit bull might be too many from society's perspective, and efficient 
liability rules \viii induce many to abandon this activity altogether.n 
On the other hand, a train's first cargo may be very valuable, and not 
well-suited for transport by barge, plane, or truck. Runuing the train 
to deliver this cargo might increase society's welfare, even if the run 
creates a significant risk of accident and induces substantial victim 
care. Running the train to deliver other cargos may be far less valu-
able, however.ro The economist's ideal liability rule will do more than 
induce injurers to abandon altogether marginal activities like walking 
the pit bull. It \viii also ensure that socially useful activities such as rail 
transportation are conducted at the appropriate level. 
How do negligence and strict liability with a defense of contribu-
tory negligence fare when it comes to assuring that socially useful ac-
tivities are conducted at the appropriate level? Because neither re-
gime \viii cause injurers to internalize the cost of victim care, it may 
58 See text accompanying notes 19-21. 
59 See Landes and Posner, Economic Struclllre of Tort Lall' at 107-09 (cited in note 3} 
(employing this example). 
60 See generally Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accidelll Law at 21-23 (cited in note 4) (as-
suming that parties derive diminishing marginal utility from activities). 
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seem that both will result in activity levels that are too high. The ac-
tual result, however, is more complicated and turns on whether the 
cost of victim care is variable or fixed. 
In some instances technology might be such that the cost of vic-
tim care is essentially fixed, that is, does not vary with the injurer's ac-
tivity level. Such is the case, of course, in the classic articulation of the 
farmer-railroad example, where victim care consists of leaving a fire-
break.61 Once incurred, such care will be sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement of reasonable victim care, regardless of how many times the 
train should run past the farrn.62 Similarly, mounting reflectors on a bi-
cycle may constitute a reasonable precaution, the cost of which does 
not vary with the activity level of motorists. "Variable" costs, on the 
other hand, are those that the victim must renew each time an injurer 
engages in the activity. For example, while a cyclist need only purchase 
one rearview mirror, he must move to the side of the road every time 
an automobile approaches. Moreover, motorists must stop at a rail-
road crossing each time the train runs by. 
To understand the link between the nature of victim care, on the 
one hand, and the efficiency of activity levels, on the other, it is useful 
to return to the farmer-railroad example. Assume that joint due care 
reduces the probability of an accident to zero. Assume further that, 
cost of renting the spark arrester to one side, the first run of the rail-
road generates a profit of $85, the second a profit of $75, the third a 
profit of $65, and so on. Finally, assume that victim care again involves 
application of a fireproof chemical each time the train runs, a variable 
cost.63 Both negligence and strict liability with a defense of contribu-
61 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186-88 (cited in note 4) (employing this ex-
ample); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law, at 38-41 (cited in note 3) (same); 
Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer,17 
J Legal Stud 15,29-30 (1988) (same). 
62 Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 38-39 (cited in note 3) (noting 
that, if victim care involves leaving a firebreak, the farmer's cost of care and profits will remain 
steady "regardless of how many trains the railroad decides to run"). See also Mark F. Grady, 
Why Are People Negligent?: Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice 
Explosion, 82 Nw U L Rev 293, 302-10 (1988) (drawing distinction between "durable" and 
"nondurable" precautions). 
63 The chemical may, for instance, evaporate between runs. As noted earlier, this example is 
contrived for expositional purposes: farmers do not really spray their crops with fireproof chemi-
cals. Still, it is easy to imagine other instances in which railroad activity could induce victim care 
that takes the form of variable costs. For instance, the number of times that victims must stop at 11 
railroad crossing gate is directly proportional to the number of trains run. See Richard A. Posner, 
A Theory of Negligence, 1 J Legal Stud 29, 52 (1972) (reporting that nine percent of cases in 11 
sample of nineteenth-century negligence cases consisted of accidents that took place at railroad 
crossings). Similarly, the number of times that a pedestrian may have to cross the street to avoid 
antagonizing a vicious dog will depend upon the number of times the dog is walked. 
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tory negligence will induce the railroad to spend $50 per run to rent a 
generic spark arrester. Moreover, the farmer will employ a modest 
fireproof chemical, at a cost of $25, each time the railroad runs. The 
railroad will run four times.61 The following table will help illustrate 
this result. 
TABLE2 
No. of Marginal Marginal Railroad Marginal Net Marginal 
Trains Injurer Victim Profits/ Railroad Social \Vealth 
Care Care Run Profits 
1 $50 $25 $85 $35 $10 
2 $50 $25 $75 $25 $0 
3 $50 $25 $65 $15 -$10 
4 $50 $25 $55 $5 -$20 
5 $50 $25 $45 -$5 -$30 
6 $50 $25 $35 -$15 -$40 
This result is inefficient. To be sure, running the railroad is so-
cially useful, as the first run generates $10 in social wealth.tl Moreover, 
society will be indifferent about the second run, which will produce 
railroad profits equal to the social cost of accidents. The third and 
fourth runs, however, will plainly destroy wealth, since the social cost 
of accidents will exceed the profits of each such run. Where the cost of 
victim care is variable, then, both negligence and strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence will produce higher than optimal 
activity levels. 
If the cost of victim care is fixed, however, analysis leads to a dif-
ferent conclusion, as illustrated by Table 3, below. Assume that, in-
stead of employing a fire-resistant chemical, reasonable care by the 
farmer involves leaving a firebreak, at a cost of $25. Under negligence 
or strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, the train 
will again run four times, earning a profit of $5 on the fourth run. The 
first run, of course, is plainly efficient. Moreover, because the cost of 
the firebreak is fixed, and therefore does not vary with the level of 
railroad activity, additional runs of the train will not induce any in-
cremental care by the victim. So long as the first run is socially 
64 The railroad will abjure a fifth run, because the profits of such a run \\ill be S45, as 
against a (private) cost of $50. 
65 The run generates $85 in profits, compared to a joint cost of care of S75. 
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justified, both negligence and strict liability with a defense of contribu-
tory negligence will lead to the proper level of activity.66 
TABLE3 
No. of Marginal Marginal Railroad Marginal Net Marginal 
Trains Injurer Victim Profits/ Railroad Social Wealth 
Care Care Run Profits 
1 $50 $25 $85 $35 $10 
2 $50 $0 $75 $25 $25 
3 $50 $0 $65 $15 $15 
4 $50 $0 $55 $5 $5 
5 $50 $0 $45 -$5 -$5 
6 $50 $0 $35 -$15 -$15 
Of course, in many cases, "reasonable" victim care will entail 
some combination of fixed and variable cost care. In these cases, both 
regimes will result in activity levels that are too high, even if some 
amount of the activity is socially justified. 
C. Injurer Care and Victim Activities 
Thus far, the discussion in this part has focused on the impact of 
liability rules on injurer activity. As noted earlier, however, the ideal 
liability regime should also induce victims to make appropriate activ-
ity choices.67 Moreover, adherents to the conventional approach have 
argued that a negligence regime will, in fact, cause victims to internal-
ize the social cost of accidents and thus make proper activity choices.63 
The analysis offered here, however, suggests that the conven-
tional conclusions are incorrect. If there is an externality of victim 
care, it would seem, there must also be a reciprocal externality of in-
jurer care. The conventional model assumes that victim activity gener-
ates two costs: (1) the cost of victim care and (2) the cost of accidents 
that may still occur despite the exercise of joint due care. The analysis 
offered here, however, suggests the existence of a third cost, namely, 
the cost of injurer care. Just as activity by the injurer leads the victim 
to take that care induced by the applicable liability rule, so too does 
66 Recall that joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents in this example, with the result 
that there are no accident losses for either party to internalize. 
67 See text accompanying notes 32-36. 
68 See text accompanying notes 33-35. 
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the "victim's decision to engage in the activity in question lead the in-
jurer to take due care. 
Identification of the externality of injurer care undermines the 
conventional account of the impact of liability rules on activity choices 
by victims. In making activity choices, victims \viii internalize their 
own cost of care. Moreover, if the activity in question is governed by a 
negligence regime, victims \vill internalize the cost of any harm that 
occurs despite joint due care. Victims \vill not, however, internalize the 
cost of injurer care induced by such a regime. So, for instance, in 
deciding whether to farm in a particular location, the fanner \vill not 
consider the cost of the spark arrester that the railroad \vill thereby be 
required to purchase. Thus, even under a negligence regime, the 
fanner may choose to farm although the benefits of this activity do 
not justify the resulting social cost of accidents. Thus, no regime of pri-
vate tort law can cause victims to make proper activity choices. 
It must be emphasized that there is no e:\1ernality of victim (or 
injurer) care in those situations in which transaction costs are low 
enough that parties can determine their respective care and activities 
by contract. For instance, there is no e:\1ernality if the activity in ques-
tion is the sale and use of a product, and the victim is well-informed 
about the product's risks and the cost of care it must incur when using 
it.69 In these circumstances, the victim will determine whether the ac-
tivity takes place, in other words, whether it will purchase the product 
in question. In making this determination, the victim will internalize 
the cost of injurer care, which \vill be reflected in the purchase price, 
as well as its own cost of care, which it \vill have to incur when it uses 
the product.70 In deciding whether to purchase the product-that is, to 
engage in the activity-the victim will internalize both the costs and 
benefits of this activity, \vith the result that activities and activity levels 
will replicate the social optimum.n 
69 See George L. Priest, A Theory of tlze Omswner Product U~rranty, 90 Yale L J 1297, 
1307-13 (1981) (arguing that, in the absence of transaction costs, manufacturer and consumer 
will allocate risks so as to minimize their joint costs of producing and using the product, includ-
ing the product's warranty). 
70 See Alan Schwartz, The Case against Strict Liability, 60 Fordham L Rev 819,824,826-27 
(1992) (arguing that consumers will bear the cost of manufacturer investments in safety and in-
surance as well as their own safety and insurance costs); Priest, 90 Yale L J at 1307-13 (cited in 
note 69) (arguing that product price, including possible warranties, reflects the value consumers 
place on insuring against defects). 
71 Moreover, the victinl 'viii internalize the cost of any accidents that may otCUr despite 
due care regardless where the law assigns this risk. Either the victinl '~ill bear these losses di-
rectly, or the manufacturer will bear them, passing them along to the \ictim in the form of higher 
prices. 
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III. ADJUSTING TORT LAW TO ACCOUNT FOR THE 
EXTERNALITY OF VICTIM CARE 
[68:1201 
As explained earlier, the dominant view of liability rules holds 
that, so long as joint due care will eliminate the risk of accidents, neg-
ligence or strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence will 
induce both injurers and victims to adopt socially optimal care and ac-
tivities.72 Thus, where such activities are concerned, the conventional 
approach concludes that a well-administered regime of private tort 
law can maximize social welfare. Moreover, where an activity is such 
that joint due care will not eliminate the risk of accidents, the domi-
nant position holds that strict liability with a defense of contributory 
negligence will lead both parties to due care and induce optimal activ-
ity choices by the injurer, thus maximizing social welfare in those in-
stances that do not require activity changes by the victim.73 Where, on 
the other hand, circumstances do not call for activity changes by the 
injurer, but instead require activity changes by the victim, the conven-
tional approach holds that a negligence regime will maximize social 
wealth, inducing injurers and victims to take due care while at the 
same time causing the victim to make proper activity choices." Thus, it 
is said, private tort law will only fail to maximize social welfare in 
those cases where both: (1) joint due care fails to eliminate the risk of 
accidents, and (2) circumstances are such that both parties must alter 
their activities in light of this risk. 
A. The Shortcomings of Private Tort Law 
This Article has identified an omission from the conventional ap-
proach to evaluating the welfare consequences of liability rules. In 
particular, the conventional model cnly recognizes one externality 
produced by an injurer's activity, namely, the risk of an accident and 
resulting damage. Thus, the conventional approach does not account 
for a second externality, namely, the cost of victim care that is induced 
by the combination of injurer activity and various liability rules in a 
joint care setting. A model that accounts for this externality generates 
different (and more accurate) conclusions about the welfare conse-
quences of various liability rules. 
In particular, neither negligence nor strict liability with a defense 
of contributory negligence will induce injurers to internalize the cost 
of victim care induced by their activities in a joint care situation. Thus, 
72 See notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
73 See text accompanying notes 28-31,34. 
74 See text accompanying notes 32-33, 35. 
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neither liability regime will reliably cause injurers to internalize the 
full social cost of accidents and thus make proper activity choices. Un-
der both regimes, for instance, some individuals will choose pit bulls as 
pets even though German shepherds are socially optimal. Further, 
when activities and technology are such that victim care is a variable 
cost, injurers \vill engage in too much of an otherwise useful activity. 
Identification of the externality of victim care suggests the exis-
tence of an additional externality, also not recognized by the conven-
tional approach, namely, the externality of injurer care. Just as injurers 
will not internalize the cost of victim care induced by their activity 
choices, so too \vill victims make activity choices \vithout internalizing 
the cost of injurer care. Even a negligence regime, then, \vill not result 
in proper activity choices by victims. 
Thus, even where joint dne care eliminates the risk of accidents, 
no regime of tort law maximizes social welfare, that is, no regime 
causes injurer and victim to replicate the activities they would have 
chosen in the absence of transaction costs.~ Similarly, where joint due 
care does not eliminate the risk of accidents, no regime is efficient, 
even in those cases which only call for a change in one party's activity. 
B. A (Hypothetical) Pigouvian Solution 
·By itself, the law of torts cannot reliably induce efficient activity 
choices in a joint care setting. Absent direct regulation of these 
choices, society could only achieve the efficient combination of care 
and activity through imposition of a Pigouvian tax.~~ For instance, if 
joint due care does not eliminate accident risk, and circumstances are 
such that only injurers shonld alter their activities, society could im-
pose strict liability \vith a defense of contributory negligence plus a tax 
on the injurer equal to the externality of victim care." Similarly, if cir-
cumstances only required victims to alter their activities, society could 
impose a negligence regime combined \vith a tax on the victim equal 
to the externality of injurer care. Such taxes would cause the party in 
question to internalize the full social cost of engaging in the activity, 
75 See Part II. 
76 Compare Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of ActMty Lel·els, 
21 J Legal Stud 319,337-55 (1992) (arguing that, by declaring violations of regulatory statutes 
negligent per se, courts enforce legislative determinations that certain activities are unreason-
able). 
77 Compare Shaven, 9 J Legal Stud at 7 & n 12 (cited in note 4) (arguing that ~if use of the 
negligence rule were supplemented by imposition of a tax on the level of injurer acti\ity, an eft1-
cient outcome could be achieved"). Of course, Professor Shavell's analysis implies that such a tax 
should be set to reflect the expected value of accident losses given reasonable precautions. The 
argument made here, on the other hand, would call for a higher ta.~ 
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causing it to make appropriate activity choices. Finally, where circum-
stances require both parties to alter their activities, society could im-
pose an appropriate liability regime as well as a Pigouvian tax on both 
• 78 parties. 
This is not to say that imposition of Pigouvian taxes will always 
be indicated "in the real world." To begin with, in some circumstances 
imposition of a Pigouvian tax will produce no improvement in social 
welfare, even if calculation and imposition of such a tax is costless. For 
instance, some activities are such that (1) society places a high value 
on one or more inframarginal iterations of the activity and (2) victim 
care takes the form of fixed costs. Such activities are socially useful, 
since the benefits of one or more iterations will outweigh the social 
cost of accidents, including the cost of victim care. Moreover, because 
the cost of victim care is fixed, marginal iterations of such an activity 
will not induce additional victim care, with the result that these incre-
mental activities will produce no externalities.79 In such circumstances, 
imposition of a Pigouvian tax equal to the (fixed) cost of victim care 
will have no effect on the injurer's activity choice or level with the re-
sult that there is no reason to incur the cost of imposing such a tax.80 
Most activities, of course, will not fall into the category just de-
scribed. For instance, in some circumstances, even inframarginal itera-
tions of an activity will have only small or modest value to society and 
thus the injuring party. In other cases, inframarginal activities may be 
quite valuable, while victim care is of a "variable cost" variety, at least 
in part. Thus, most activities are such that failure to internalize the ex-
ternality of victim care will lead to improper activity choices, activity 
78 One finds an analogy in Professor Shavell's suggestion that, where circumstances require 
both injurer and victim to alter their activity levels, society can achieve the efficient result by im-
posing a negligence regime combined with a tax on the injurer equal to expected accident losses. 
Id. Professor Shavell suggests that such a regime would produce the efficient result by ensuring 
that "the expected payments of injurers and of victims would each equal expected accident 
losses." Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 29-30 (cited in note 4). See also Cooter 
and Ulen, Law and Economics at 280-81 (cited in note 5) (noting that, where both parties must 
alter their activity choices, an "additional control variable from outside liability law" is necessary, 
such as a tax on the injurer's activity). The conclusions of this Article, of course, require a modifi-
cation of this prescription. First, the tax on the injurer would have to be raised to account for the 
externality of victim care. Second, society would have to impose a tax on the victim equal to the 
externality of injurer care. 
79 See notes 61-66 and accompanying text (showing that externality of victim care will not 
result in improper activity choices where the activity in question is socially useful and the cost of 
victim care is fixed). 
80 See generally Landes and Posner, Economic Stmcture of Tort Law at 109-10 (cited in 
note 3) (arguing that courts should not incur costs of administering a rule of strict liability if such 
a regime will not induce changes in activity). Moreover, in those cases in which the cost of opti-
mal victim care is relatively small, inducing the injurer to internalize this cost may not cause it to 
alter its activity appreciably. 
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levels that are too high, or both. In such cases, imposition of a Pigou-
vian tax would be part of the first best regulatory solution in a world 
of costless public regulation. Nevertheless, one suspects that such a so-
lution would present serious problems in the "real world," as one or 
more administrative agencies struggles to calculate the ex1ernality of 
victim care and/or the externality of injurer care in order to determine 
the appropriate tax or taxes.81 
C. Alternatives to a Pigouvian Tax 
Importantly, Pigouvian taxes, negligence, and strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence do not exhaust the alternatives 
available to policymakers or courts. Instead, there are private law al-
ternatives that will cause injurers to act as if or almost as if they had 
internalized the externality of victim care. These regimes have short-
comings of their own, and thus still constitute "second best" methods 
of regulation. Nonetheless, as shown below, these alternatives may in 
some cases offer improvements over negligence or strict liability with 
a defense of contributory negligence, further obviating the case for 
Pigouvian taxes.82 
1. Pure strict liability. 
Assume that for a given combination of activities, society is only 
concerned \vith the externality of victim care and thus only wishes to 
induce activity changes by the injurer.n The most straightfonvard al-
ternative regime would be "pure" strict liability, that is, strict liability 
\vith no defense of contributory negligence. Such a regime, of course, 
would eliminate victim care entirely, with the result that there would 
be no "externality" \vith which to be concerned.~\& Still, this rule would 
suffer from shortcomings of its own. In the absence of any victim care, 
injurers would be led to increase their own care to replace the (more 
Sl See RH. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 26 (Chicago 19813) ("The fact that 
governmental intervention also has its costs makes it very likely that most 'externalities' should 
be allowed to continue if the value of production is to be maximized."). 
82 It should be noted that courts could induce injurers to internalize the cost of victim care 
by awarding a premium over compensatory damages equal to the expected cost of \ictim care 
produced by the activity. Of course, this option would only be available in those instances in 
which joint due care did not eliminate accident risk. 
83 Perhaps the victim's activity is socially useful, while care by the injurer is of a fixed cost 
variety. In these circumstances, there is no reason to cause the victim to internalilc the external-
ity of injurer care, as such internalization will not affect the victim's acti\ity choices. Sec notes 
61--66 and accompanying te"t 
84 See note 16 and accompanying text. 
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efficient) precautions forgone by the victim.!'S The result, of course, 
would be excessive care, excessive accident costs, or both, increasing 
the social cost of accidents attributable to each iteration of the activity. 
Put another way, a regime of pure strict liability would result in an in-
crease in the social cost of accidents, and thus a marginal cost of in-
jurer activity higher than necessary to force internalization of the cost 
of efficient victim precautions.:;6 Pure strict liability, then, would elimi-
nate marginal, inefficient activities but at the same time eliminate 
some efficient activities and increase the cost of inframarginal activi-
ties. The extent of these drawbacks-and thus the choice between 
pure strict liability and negligence or strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence-would depend upon the extent to which in-
jurer care provided a ready substitute for care by the victim. If, for in-
stance, injurer care were an excellent substitute for victim care, pure 
strict liability would cause the social cost of accidents, and thus the so-
cial cost per inframarginal activity, to rise only slightly. Thus, activity 
choices and levels would diverge only somewhat from the optimum, 
with the result that "pure" strict liability would be preferable, albeit 
still second best. On the other hand, if injurer care were a poor substi-
tute for care by the victim, pure strict liability would induce significant 
increases in the cost of care, resulting accidents, or both, thus causing 
activity to diverge substantially from the social optimum. In these cir-
cumstances, elimination of the externality of victim care would come 
at a high price, and society would likely prefer negligence or strict li-
ability with a defense of contributory negligence. 
2. Enhanced negligence. 
A second, less obvious alternative also presents itself, namely, an 
"enhanced" negligence regime that artificially inflates the level of in-
jurer precautions that constitute "due care." More precisely, in those 
cases where the injurer's activity is governed by a negligence regime, 
85 Consider Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186-88 (cited in note 4) (employing an 
example in which, absent care by the farmer, the railroad must incur $100 to prevent an accident, 
where joint care costing $75 would have sufficed). See also Table 1. 
86 That pure strict liability will increase the social cost of accidents, for example, the sum of 
(I) expenditure on care and (2) the expected value of accidents, necessarily follows, of course, 
from the assumption that the activity in question calls for joint care. See Landes and Posner, 
Economic Structure of Tort Law at 59--QO, 73-74 (cited in note 3) (defining a joint care situation 
as one in which care by both parties is necessary to minimize the social cost of accidents). If 
some victim care is cost justified and induces a greater reduction in the probability of an accident 
than an equivalent expenditure on injurer care, forgoing such victim care will increase the social 
cost of accidents. See id at 39 (concluding that strict liability without a defense of contributory 
negligence will result in a higher than optimal social cost of accidents in a joint care setting). 
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courts could set the injurer's standard of due care so that the cost of 
injurer care is equal to the cost of joint due care that a negligence re-
gime would otherwise produce.67 Such a regime would induce the in-
juring party to choose activities and activity levels that are socially op-
timal.ss Like a regime of pure strict liability, of course, such a regime 
would produce higher than optimal costs per activity: that increment 
of injurer care above its non-enhanced level of due care would be less 
efficient than similar expenditures made by the victim and thus pro-
duce a higher than optimum probability of accidents. Still, an en-
hanced negligence regime would likely involve a lower social cost per 
activity than a regime of pure strict liability, as the former would in-
duce at least some care by the victim, albeit less than would be in-
duced by a regime of ordinary negligence.81 The cost of joint care-the 
injurer's enhanced care plus the cost of any care still taken by the vic-
tim-would necessarily be lower than the cost of care induced by a 
regime of pure strict liability, which induces only the injurer to take 
(less efficient) care.90 This is not to say that enhanced negligence will 
always be superior to pure strict liability. In those circumstances in 
which, despite due care, accidents may still occur, pure strict liability 
may be preferable to enhanced negligence, as the latter will not induce 
the injurer to internalize the cost of those accidents that occur despite 
the care taken by both parties. If, on the other hand, joint due care 
eliminates the risk of accidents, society will prefer a regime of en-
hanced negligence, as such a regime will result in a lower social cost of 
accidents than a regime of pure strict liability. 
'61 Compare Polinsky, 70 Am Econ Rev Papers and Proceeilings at 365-66 (cited in note 
18} (suggesting that courts can reduce the number of injurers participating in an acti\ity by set-
ting the standard of care higher than would otherwise be optimal). 
88 Id. It should be noted that such a rule would only induce the optimal acti\ity level if 
technology were such that an injurer faced a seamless array of precaution options. In the short 
run, at least, this may not be the case. For instance, the spark arrester industry may produce only 
two arresters: one "generic" arrester that costs less than the "enhanced"le\el or care. and one 
"super" arrester that costs more. See Table 1. In these circumstances, only adoption or the supl!r 
spark arrester will satisfy the requirement of the enhanced due care standard. as purchase or the 
generic arrester will fall short. Over the longer run, however, technology may be sufficiently plas-
tic that the injurer's precaution options are endogenous to legal rules. 
89 Because the increment of enhanced injurer care is necessarily less efficient than similar 
care by the victim, the injurer's adherence to the standard or enhanced due care \\ill not elimi-
nate the chance of an accident. Victims would thus take whatever care is rc:lSOnable in light of 
the remaining risk. See note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that a negligence regime \\ill 
induce the victim to take those precautions that are cost justified in light of care taken by the in-
jurer). 
90 See text accompanying notes 27-29. 
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3. Choosing among alternative regimes. 
This is not to say that society will always prefer enhanced negli-
gence or pure strict liability to more traditional rules. If the cost of vic-
tim care is fixed, for instance, and the activity in question is socially 
useful, no purpose is served by causing the injuring party to act as 
though it internalizes the externality of victim care, with the result that 
departure from traditional rules is unwarranted.91 On the other hand, 
one can easily imagine categories of activity that would seem to call 
for adoption of "pure" strict liability or "enhanced" negligence. For in-
stance, a strong case could be made for adoption of one of these re-
gimes upon a showing of the following factors: (1) variable cost victim 
care; (2) optimal victim precautions that are relatively costly; and (3) 
relatively elastic demand for the injurer's activity. Similarly, a strong 
case could be made if: (1) injurers place little value on even 
inframarginal iterations of the activity and (2) victim care-whether 
fixed or variable cost-is relatively expensive. In either case, forcing 
injurers to internalize the cost of victim care will induce significant 
(efficient) changes in activities and/or activity levels, changes that may 
justify departure from more standard rules. 
In sum, negligence or strict liability with a defense of contribu-
tory negligence will produce improper activity choices and levels in 
most cases. Absent imposition of a Pigouvian tax, courts must choose 
between various imperfect liability rules to regulate care and activi-
ties. Where joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents, courts 
should choose between ordinary negligence, strict liability with a de-
fense of contributory negligence, or enhanced negligence. Where, on 
the other hand, joint due care does not eliminate such risks, and no 
change in victim activity is indicated, courts must choose between 
pure strict liability, enhanced negligence, or strict liability with a de-
fense of contributory negligence.92 No regime, it should be emphasized, 
will induce the appropriate care and activity. Instead, the choice is be-
tween various imperfect alternatives. 
IV. TwO REMAINING QUESTIONS 
This Article has identified a flaw in the model scholars currently 
employ to evaluate the economic consequences of common law liabil-
ity rules. In particular, the dominant model ignores the cost of victim 
care induced by injurer activity. Moreover, the dominant model ig-
91 See notes 61-66,79 and accompanying text. 
92 There would, of course, be no reason to choose a regime of ordinary negligence, given 
the assumption that no change in victim activity is necessary. 
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nores the cost of injurer care that results from victim activity. Because 
it does not recognize these externalities, the dominant model gener-
ates false conclusions about the welfare consequences of negligence 
and strict liability \vith a defense of contributory negligence. Recogni-
tion of the inadequacy of the current model raises two questions ex-
plored in this part: (1) what accounts for the oversight identified here, 
and (2) what the implications are, if any, of this oversight for the posi-
tive economic theory of tort law. 
A. Explaining the Omission 
The omission of the externality of victim care from the conven-
tional model is puzzling at first. After all, this model purports to in-
clude expenditures on victim care as a component of the social cost of 
accidents, and scholars employ this model to identify the liability rule 
or rules that minimize these costs.93 Nevertheless, these same scholars 
have failed to treat victim care as an externality and thus generated 
incorrect conclusions about the welfare consequences of various 
liability rules. Closer inspection, however, suggests a likely explanation 
for this oversight. The omission, it seems, is at least partly attributable 
to the use of the farmer-railroad exemplar as a vehicle for examining 
the effect of liability rules, as well as the distinction between fixed and 
variable cost victim care discussed earlier. 
Like other scientists, economists build models in response to real 
or perceived problems or puzzles.~ A model that "solves" such prob-
lems is deemed successful, and this model becomes the basis for the 
solution of other puzzles as well.95 Where the law of torts is concerned, 
several scholars have treated the interaction of a farmer and a railroad 
as an important problem, requiring such a solution. Raised by Pigou 
long before the modem law and economics movement,"' this example 
93 See notes 4 and 12 and accompanying text. 
94 See Thomas S. Kuhn, Tlze StrucJure of Scielllijic Revolmions 23-24,35-42 (Chicago 2d cd 
1970) (arguing that scientists construct new paradigms to solve real or perceived puzzles not 
adequately addressed by current paradigms). 
95 See id at 23 ("Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their 
competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as 
acute. To be more successful is not, however, to be either completely sucecssful \~ith a single 
problem or notably successful with any large number."); see also id at 23-24. 
96 See AC. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 118 (MacMillan 2d cd 1924) (emplo)ing this 
example to illustrate the problem of externality). See also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 
185-90 (cited in note 4) (discussing Pigou's farmer-railroad example); Landes and Posner, Eco-
nomic Structure of Tort Law at 6-7 (cited in note 3) (describing Pigou's analysis based on the 
farmer-railroad example as a "direct antecedent of the modem economic approach to torts"); 
Grady, 17 J Legal Stud at 19,41 (cited in note 61) (referring to the fanner-railroad example as 
"the paradigm that has guided so much recent thought"); Richard A. Posner, Strict Li'ability: A 
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has served as an important vehicle for illustrating and evaluating the 
effect of various tort liability rules on primary conduct and thus social 
welfare. Any model that "solves" this problem, by explaining the ef-
fect of tort rules on the conduct of the farmer and the railroad, has 
been deemed "successful" and thus capable of solving other problems 
deemed "similar."97 Moreover, a conclusion that certain rules cause 
both parties to behave efficiently has been taken to establish that such 
rules would cause parties in other settings to behave efficiently as 
well.98 
As it turns out, the farmer-railroad example provides a poor basis 
for constructing a model that evaluates the impact of liability rules on 
activity choices and thus social welfare. In particular, the classic articu-
lation of this example involves victim care-leaving a firebreak-the 
cost of which is fixed in that it does not vary with the level of the rail-
road's activity.99 Moreover, the problem is described as involving a 
choice between various levels of the same activity-transporting cargo 
by rail-and not between different types of activity. 100 Indeed, even 
some scholars who do not employ the farmer-railroad example never-
theless characterize the problem of activity choice as involving a deci-
sion between different levels of a given activity, without examining the 
possibility that an injurer might shift to a different activity alto-
gether.101 Given these artificially restrictive assumptions, the external-
Comment, 2 J Legal Stud 205, 205-212 (1973) (invoking the "now familiar example of the rail-
road engine that emits sparks which damage crops along the railroad's right of way"); Demsetz, I 
J Legal Stud at 14 (cited in note 2) (discussing farmer-railroad example); Coase,3 J L & Econ at 
29-34 (cited in note 50) (same). 
97 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186-90 (cited in note 4) (employing farmer-
railroad example to derive generalizable conclusions about the impact of various liability rules); 
Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 31-41,54-77 (cited in note 3) (employing 
farmer-railroad example to model effects of negligence and strict liability on care and activity 
choices and derive more general conclusions). 
98 See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 107-22 (cited in note 3) (ap-
plying conclusions first generated via farmer-railroad example to evaluate efficiency of tort law 
generally). 
99 Once built, this precaution constitutes due care, regardless of the level of the railroad's 
activity. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 186-88 (cited in note 4) (assuming that 
farmer's construction of a firebreak constitutes due care without regard to the activity level of 
the railroad); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 31-41 (cited in note 3) (not-
ing that expenditure on care will produce given profit for farmer "regardless of how many trains 
the railroad decides to run"). 
too See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 31-41 (cited in note 3); 
Coase,3 J L & Econ 31-32 (cited in note 50). 
tot See Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 21-32 (cited in note 4); Polinsky, in-
troduction to Law and Economics at 46-50 (cited in note 2). To be sure, Professor Shavcll docs 
note that injurers must decide "whether" to engage in a particular activity. See Shavell, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Accident Law at 5 (cited in note 4). However, when considering the effect of 
various liability rules on injurer conduct he only examiues "the influence of the rules on parties' 
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ity of victim care is all but invisible. Almost by definition, the activity 
in question-carriage by rail-is socially useful. Moreover, the cost of 
reasonable victim care is the same regardless of the railroad's activity 
level. Thus, the externality of victim care simply does not present itself, 
as changes in the injurer's activity level impose no incremental costs 
on the victim.102 Relaxation of the restrictive assumptions associated 
'vith the farmer-railroad example reveals this externality and allows 
construction of a model that can produce generalizable conclusions. 
B. Implications for the Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law 
Revision of the conventional model will naturally have implica-
tions for the positive economic theory of tort law. As e:h-plained earlier, 
this theory holds that the common law of torts is comprised of rules 
that tend to maximize social welfare, by inducing parties to replicate 
that mix of care and activities that they would have chosen in the ab-
sence of transaction costs.103 This Article has shown that no regime of 
tort liability will cause injurers or victims to make proper activity 
choices in a joint care setting. Only imposition of a Pigouvian tax, 
coupled with negligence or strict liability \vith a defense of contribu-
tory negligence, will maximize social welfare. \Vhile perhaps surpris-
ing, this finding does not by itself undermine the positive economic 
theory of tort law. As noted earlier, a system of Pigouvian taxes may 
be fraught \vith administrative costs, costs that militate against legisla-
tive adoption of such a regime.104 At any rate, courts have no authority 
to adopt Pigouvian or other taxes; failure to do so does not by itself 
establish that the common law is inefficient. 
Indeed, the findings of this Article may lend some support to the 
positive economic theory of tort law. Consider the law's treatment of 
ultrahazardous activities.'us The conventional approach concludes that 
only strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence will pro-
duce the appropriate care by the victim and appropriate care and ac-
levels of activity." Id at 21 (emphasis added). See Carol M. Rose. The Shadow of the Cathedral, 
106 Yale L J 2175,2177-82,2197 (1997) (arguing that leading literature on the distinction b~· 
tween property rights and liability rules rests on the unarticulated "shadow example" or auto-
mobile accidents). 
102 See notes 61-66 and accompanying text (demonstrating that firms engaged in socially 
useful activities will make efficient activity choices wlten the cost of reasonable victim care is 
fixed). 
103 See notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
104 See note 81 and accompanying text. 
105 I am grateful to Richard Posner and Gary Myers. who both suggested that tort law's 
treatment of ultrahazardous activities may reflect concern Cor the externality of victim care iden-
tified here. 
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tivity by the injurer engaged in the activity. 106 Yet, contributory negli-
gence is generally not a defense to a tort premised on strict liability, a 
result that would seem inconsistent with the positive economic the-
ory.107 The analysis offered here, however, suggests a rationale for dis-
pensing with such a defense where strict liability is otherwise indi-
cated. To be sure, a defense of contributory negligence will minimize 
the social cost of accidents caused by a particular activity. Neverthe-
less, such an activity, or the level at which it is conducted, may be inef-
ficient in light of the resulting externality of victim care.1"" "Pure" strict 
liability may therefore be preferable, particularly in those instances 
where (1) injurer care is a close substitute for care by the victim, and 
(2) close substitutes exist for the activity in question so that internali-
zation of the cost of victim care will induce significant changes in the 
activity.109 In these circumstances, pure strict liability will induce sig-
nificant changes in the injurer's activity, while causing only a modest 
increase in the cost of remaining iterations of the activity. Indeed, ab-
juring a defense of contributory negligence where such activities are 
involved may do more than reduce the injurer's activity level; it may 
also cause the injurer to switch to a different activity altogether, thus 
replicating the result that would be produced by a Pigouvian tax. 
Still, there does not appear to be a perfect "fit" between the law 
of strict liability and the prescriptions of economic theory as qualified 
here. There is no apparent reason to conclude that pure strict liability 
will inevitably be superior to a regime that recognizes a defense of 
contributory negligence. No doubt there are some activities where (1) 
injurer care is a poor substitute for care by the victim, and (2) the in-
106 See notes 27-31 and accompanying text. As noted earlier. the conventional approach 
also concludes-correctly-that strict liability will not induce the victim to internalize the cost of 
accidents that occur despite due care. Moreover, this Article has demonstrated that neither neg-
ligence nor strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence will induce the victim to in-
ternalize the cost of injurer care. It is generally assumed, however, that changes in victim activity 
are not efficient methods of accident reduction where ultrahazardous activities are concerned, 
and the analysis that follows adheres to this assumption. See, for example, Landes and Posner, 
Economic Structure of Tort Law at 113 (cited in note 3) (noting that victims of construction 
blasting cannot feasibly avoid such injuries by changing locations, because construction is ubiqui-
tous). 
107 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 524 (providing that contributory negligence is gen-
erally not a defense to the tort of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities). See also Landes 
and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 118-20 (cited in note 3) (exploring this apparent 
inconsistency). 
108 As noted earlier, Professor Landes and Judge Posner recognize that the cost of victim 
care may in some cases outweigh the benefits of an ultrahazardous activity. See note 106. TI1ey 
do not, however, consider the implications of this finding for their general conclusions regarding 
the welfare consequences of various liability rules. See id. 
109 See notes 86-87 and accompanying text (suggesting that pure strict liability will be supe-
rior to strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence under these conditions). 
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jurer's activity has no close substitutes. Imposition of "pure" strict li-
ability on these activities will raise the social cost of inframarginal it-
erations, \vithout causing a significant alteration of the activity. In 
these circumstances, it seems, pure strict liability may well be inferior 
to a regime of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. 
The failure to recognize such a defense in these circumstances would 
seem inconsistent with the positive economic theory of tort law.m 
There may be less to this apparent inconsistency than meets the 
eye, however. Modem tort law, it seems, defines the class of activities 
subject to strict liability in a manner that excludes those activities for 
which a defense of contributory negligence is indicated. More pre-
cisely, in determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous" 
and thus subject to strict liability, courts consider, inter alia, tl1e extent 
to which the activity is "ordinary" or "natural" for the region in ques-
tion as well as the net social value of the activity, an inquiry that in-
cludes a consideration of potential substitutes.111 Activities that are 
"unnatural" and of little value will be deemed "abnormally danger-
ous" and thus subject to strict liability if. despite due care, they involve 
a significant degree of risk.112 Such activities, it seems, will have close 
substitutes, with the result that imposition of strict liability will cause 
the injurer to scale them down or abandon them altogether.m On the 
other hand, activities that are both "natural" and "valuable" are gen-
erally not deemed "abnormally dangerous" even if joint due care fails 
to eliminate the risk of accidents. 114 In these circumstances it seems less 
likely that close substitutes exist for the activity in question, with the 
result that imposition of strict liability will have little effect on the ac-
tivity. liS Such activities are therefore governed by a negligence regime, 
110 To be sure, the law of strict liability does recognize a defense of contributory negligence 
in limited circumstances. See Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 524(2). The availability of such a 
defense, however, does not turn on the nature of the underlying activity, but instead upon the 
victim's state of mind. See id illustrations 1 and 2 ("plaintiffs contributory negligence in know-
ingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk of harm from the activity is a defense"). 
111 See Restatement (Second} ofTorts § 520(d)-(f), cmts 1-k. 
112 See id at § 520(a)-(c). See also W. Page Keeton, Prosser ami 1\eeron 011 Torts 537 (West 
5th ed 1984). 
113 See Landes and Posner, Eco11omic Srrucmre of Torr Law at 112-13 (cited in note 3) 
("The more valuable a land use [for water storage] is relative to its alternatives, the less like!)' it 
is to be changed by the imposition of liability for accidents that can be avoided only by altering 
the activity."); id at 113 (concluding that blasting is properly deemed ultrahazardous bzcause 
there are substitutes for such activity). 
114 See Restatement (Second) of Torts,§ 520(d}-(f) (considering \\hether the acthity is "of 
common usage," "inappropriate ... to the place where it is carried on," and "considering its \'<llue 
to the community," despite its dangerous character). 
115 See Landes and Posner, Economic Srnzcmre o[Torr Law at 112-13 (cited in note 3).See 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt k (staling that the storage of water in reservoirs is 
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which will, of course, induce victims to take reasonable care. Thus, the 
definition of "abnormally dangerous" and concomitant imposition of 
"pure" strict liability includes only those activities for which there are 
close substitutes such that internalization of the externality of victim 
care will have a sign~ficant effect on activity choices. Recognition of a 
contributory negligence defense in these circumstances would likely 
produce activity choices that diverge significantly from the optimum. 
On the other hand, activities for which there are no close substitutes 
are governed by a negligence regime that induces reasonable victim 
care. The absence of a defense of contributory negligence to strict li-
ability seems therefore consistent with the positive economic theory 
of tort law. 
The findings of this Article pose a greater challenge to the posi-
tive economic theory of tort law where the law of negligence is con-
cerned. The conventional account of liability rules holds that, where 
joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents, a well-administered 
negligence regime will maximize social welfare. Moreover, proponents 
of the positive economic theory argue that tort law does just that, ab-
juring strict liability in favor of a negligence regime whenever joint 
due care eliminates accident risk. 116 
This Article has shown that a properly administered negligence 
regime will not, in fact, produce optimal activity choices in those in-
stances in which joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents. ln par-
ticular, such a regime will not cause injurers to internalize the cost of 
victim care induced by their activities. Moreover, in some cases, a re-
gime of "enhanced negligence" will produce a combination of joint 
care and injurer activity that more closely approaches the optimum. 117 
As a result, proof that courts have adopted a regime of ordinary negli-
gence whenever joint due care eliminates the risk of accidents may ac-
tually militate against the positive economic theory, by establishing 
that courts have refused to adopt regimes of enhanced negligence 
when it may be efficient to do so. 
Indeed, the findings of this Article should cause proponents of 
the positive economic theory to rethink their characterization of the 
law of negligence. In particular, these scholars may wish to consider 
assertions by other scholars that courts have on occasion imposed 
stringent (enhanced?) duties of care on injuring parties, while at the 
"abnormally dangerous" in areas where "constant streams and abundant rains" make such stor-
age "unnecessary for ordinary or general purposes"). 
116 See Landes and Posner, Economic Structure ofTort Law at 107 (cited in note 3). 
117 See notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
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same time requiring victims to exercise only modest precautions.u' 
Such an articulation of the respective duties of injurer and victim, 
while inconsistent \vith the conventional approach, could reflect a ju-
dicial attempt to internalize the externality of victim care via adoption 
of a regime of enhanced negligence.119 Here again, identification of the 
externality of victim care could actually bolster the positive economic 
theory, by explaining a definition of negligence that would otherwise 
appear inconsistent \vith economic theory. Now armed with a revised 
model that tells them what to look for, proponents of the positive 
economic theory may be able to build stronger case. I:") 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers and economists have come to a consensus about the so-
cial consequences of various common law liability rules. In particular, 
scholars have asserted that a negligence regime will produce optimal 
victim and injurer activity whenever reasonable joint care eliminates 
the risk of accidents. These same scholars have also asserted that, 
where reasonable joint care does not eliminate the risk of accidents, 
strict liability \vith a defense of contributory negligence will produce 
optimal injurer activity, while a negligence regime will induce optimal 
activity by the victim. This Article has demonstrated that each of these 
conclusions rests upon a flawed model for evaluating the economic 
118 For instance, one scholar has concluded that, during the nineteenth century, courts in 
New Hampshire and California held injurers to a standard ofuutmost care," while at the same 
time excusing victims for "indiscretion," "mere error in judgment," or ulapses of memory." Gary 
T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineleellth·Cenlllry America: A Rt:illlerpretation, 90 
Yale LJ 1717,1757-63 (1981).Indeed, California courts found that the emission of sp:uks from a 
railroad engine was itself prima facie proof of negligence, because a upcrfect" railroad engine 
would not produce sparks. Id at 1746. See also Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and SL Louis Railroad Co v 
Nelson, 51 Ind (Black) 150, 153-54 (1875): 
If the company, by availing itself of all the discoveries which science and experience have 
put within its reach, could have constructed its machinery so perfect as to prevent the emis-
sion of sparks or the dropping of coals, and if the machinery used in this case was not so 
perfect as to accomplish this purpose, the fact that the machinery used was such as was in 
common and general use, and had been approved by experience, did not relieve the appel-
lant from liability. 
Moreover, the courts of California and New Hampshire also concluded that placing crops too 
close to railroad tracks could not constitute contributory negligence. Schwartz, 90 Yale L J at 
1747. Similarly, another scholar has found that courts sometimes e:-:cuse victims for forgetfulness 
or inadvertence but that there is "no decision inununizing a defendant who has forgotten a rea-
sonable precaution." Grady, 82 Nw U L Rev at 304-05 (cited in note 62) (emphasis added). 
119 See notes 87-90 and accompanying text (ex-plaining that such a regime would entail en-
hanced care by the injurer and reduced care by the victim). 
120 See Kulm, Stmctllfe of Scielltijic RevolutioiiS at 114-17 (cited in note 94) (explaining that 
paradigm changes cause reinterpretation of previously observed phenomena). 
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consequences of liability rules. That model, it has been shown, does 
not account for the externality of victim care, that is, the cost of victim 
care induced by injurer activity in a joint care setting. Because of this 
externality, both negligence and strict liability with a defense of con-
tributory negligence will produce activity levels above the optimum. 
Absent imposition of a Pigouvian tax, no liability rule will maximize 
social welfare. 
Identification of the externality of victim care suggests the exis-
tence of another externality, namely, the externality of injurer care. 
Neither negligence nor strict liability with a defense of contributory 
negligence will cause victims to internalize this cost. Thus, even a neg-
ligence regime will not cause victims to make proper activity choices, 
unless accompanied by imposition of a Pigouvian tax. 
The failure to recognize these externalities previously may be due 
in part to overreliance on the farmer-railroad exemplar as a vehicle 
for illustrating and examining the effect of various liability rules on ac-
tivity choices. Relaxation of the restrictive assumptions associated 
with this example reveals the externality of victim care, thus paving 
the way for recognition of the externality of injurer care. Moreover, 
recognition of these externalities may actually bolster the positive 
economic theory of tort law by providing explanations for certain doc-
trines that otherwise appear inconsistent with economic theory. 
